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COMMENTS
LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE RELIGION FACTOR
IN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
Adoption first became of judicial importance in the United States about
the middle of the nineteenth century with the enactment by the Massachu-
setts legislature, in 1851, of adoption legislation.' Prior to this time, adop-
tion had been unknown in the United States, it being unknown at com-
mon law. 2 The statutes on adoption in England were enacted in 1926, its
birth in that country following much later than in the United States.3
Although in derogation of the common law, modern courts have tended
to construe the adoption statutes liberally; the strict construction ap-
proach giving way to the paramount consideration of the child's best in-
terests and welfare.4
The adoption statutes in the United States take on a variety of forms.
Most state legislatures have detailed the procedural elements in adoption.6
Earlier statutes show a decided tendency toward covering the suitability
of the proposed adoption generally by merely pointing up the pertinent
factors to be considered such as the physical, financial and spiritual well-
being of the child. With this type of legislation the courts are free from
any legislative mandate in placing emphasis on any single factor; the only
mandate being that judicial discretion rest with the best interests of the
child.6
Recent adoption enactments, however, evidence a desire on the part of
legislatures to emphasize the religion element when a child is placed in a
foster home. Special provisions in the adoption statutes have been inserted
in later statutes concerning the preservation of the child's religion with
material factors remaining in the area of elements generally to be consid-
ered when deciding the issue of the child's welfare.
The special provisions on religion vary, of course, from state to state.
Most statutes which emphasize religion provide that when practicable a
1 Mass. L. (1851) c. 324.
2 1 Am. Jur., Adoption of Children 9§ 3-10 (1936); 2 C. J. S., Adoption of Children
§§ 1-4 (1936). For a complete history of adoption in the United States see Ross v.
Ross, 129 Mass. 243 (1880).
3 Adoption of Children Act (1926) (16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29) § 8.
4 Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 I11. 115, 195 N.E. 657 (1935); Waller v. Ellis, 169 Md. 15,
179 Atl. 289 (1935); In re Jaren's Adoption, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W. 2d 656 (1947);
Fletcher v. Flanery, 185 Va. 409, 38 S.E. 2d 433 (1946); In re McFarland, 223 Mo. App.
826, 12 S.W. 2d 523 (1928) (wherein the court held for strict construction but modi-
fied it to the extent that it should not be so narrowly construed as to defeat the in-
tent of the law).
5 54 Col. L. Rev. 376 (1954). Statutory Appendix.
6 23 A. L. R. 2d 701 (1952); 1 Am. Jur., Adoption of Children § 47 (1936); 2 C. J. S.,
Adoption of Children § 6 (1936).
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child must be placed for adoption with persons of the same religious faith
as that of the child 7 or the natural parents.8 Illinois, and other states, pro-
vide that this shall be done whenever possibleY The wording of some
statutes is slightly different from the above. The Tennessee law recites
that the children "are" to be placed with persons of the same religion "as
far as is practicable."'1 Minnesota requires that the court "shall" place the
child in the same religious atmosphere "so far as it deems practicable."'"
Only a few jurisdictions have had litigation on these exact provisions.
These include Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York and Penn-
sylvania. 12 Both mandatory and discretionary constructions have been de-
cided upon. In upholding them the courts do not view them as tending
toward the establishment of a religion since they endeavor to protect only
the right the child has to the preservation of his religious heritage.13 It is
interesting to note the judicial interpretations, particularly, in view of the
general treatment accorded religion earlier.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently has decided
three cases directly involving the Massachusetts provision for the safe-
guarding of the religion of the child. The statute, enacted in 1950, reads:
In making orders for adoption the judge when practicable must give custody
only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. In the event that
there is a dispute as to the religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed
to be that of its mother. If the court, with due regard for the religion of the
child, shall nevertheless grant the petition for adoption of a child proffered
by a person or persons of a religious faith or persuasion other than that of the
child, the court shall state the facts which impelled it to make such a dispo-
sition .... 14
The first case interpreting the statute was Petition of Gally. 5 In that
case the petitioners for adoption were of a different religion than that of
the mother of the child. In all other respects the court found the petition-
ers to be highly reputable and qualified persons to adopt a child. The
child's mother consented to the adoption. The court granted the decree,
holding that in this instance it was not "practicable" for the court to place
the child with persons of the child's faith. In support of its view the court
pointed out that no person of the faith of the child's mother was seeking
7 Ann. Laws Mass. (Supp., 1953) v. 6, c. 210 § 5B.
8 N.Y. Dorn. Rel. Law (McKinney, 1941) c. 14, § 115.
9 I11. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 4, § 4-2; Penn. Stat. Ann. (Purdon Supp., 1954) tit. 1, § 4.
10Tenn. Pub. Acts (1949) c. 127.
11 Minn. Stat. (1949) § 260.01-.34.
12 See 54 Col. L. Rev. 376 (1954). Statutory Appendix.
13 1 Am. Jur., Adoption of Children §9 3-10 (1936); 2 C. J. S., Adoption of Chil-
dren §§ 5-7 (1936).
14 Ann. Laws Mass. (Supp., 1953) v. 6, c. 210 § 5B; Emphasis added.
15 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E. 2d 21 (1952). An earlier case was decided on other
grounds, Krakow v. Dept. Public Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 95 N.E. 2d 184 (1950).
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to adopt the child and that there was no evidence that in the future any
such person would offer to do so. Practicality, the court said, is the test
and when it is "practical" the court must give religion controlling weight.
Commenting on the legislative intent, the court said that the legislature
did not intend that religion be necessarily the chief consideration or
a fortiori, the sole guide. In considering the history of the religion factor
in adoption in that state, the court quoted the leading case of Purinton v.
Jamrock'6 wherein it was held to be the general policy of Massachusetts
to secure for a child the right to be brought up in the religion of his par-
ents where this is reasonably practicable.
It appears then that the Gaily case turned essentially on the fact that
there was no person brought to the attention of the court of the same faith
as that of the child and who also was seeking to adopt the child. No
change in the weight to be accorded religion was noticed by the majority,
though, as the dissent points out, at the time of the Purinton case no stat-
ute emphasizing religion was in effect. The dissent argues that the statute
lays down a general rule that virtually treats the type of cases where the
petition is allowed to persons of a different faith to be the exception. This
appears to be the more reasonable view, at least, with the spirit if not the
letter of the statute.
The next case in that jurisdiction was Petitions of Goldmans.17 In that
case a Catholic mother gave her consent to the adoption of her twins by
qualified Jewish petitioners. The children were to be raised in the Jewish
faith. The petition for adoption was denied, the court holding that in this
case it would not be "practicable" to place the child with persons of a dif-
ferent faith. In support of this holding the court made a finding that many
Catholic couples were seeking to adopt Catholic children through the
Catholic Charities Bureau.
The court when discussing its decision in Petition of Gaily'8 noted that
that case came up on appeal entirely on documentary evidence and that
they were in as favorable a position as the probate judge to review the
case but that in the instant case the evidence was to a great extent oral and
that the court was bound by the rule that findings based on parol evidence
can be reversed only if they are plainly wrong.
The essential difference in the Gally and Goldman cases appears to be
the finding in the former case that no Catholic couples were brought to
the attention of the court that sought to adopt Catholic children and in
the latter that the Catholic Charities Bureau could direct the court to po-
tential adopters of the same faith as that of the children.
With the decision in Ellis v. McCoy,19 it appears that the decision in the
16 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907).
17 121 N.E. 2d 843 (Mass., 1954); noted in 4 De Paul L. Rev. 307 (1955).
18 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E. 2d 21 (1952). 19 124 N.E. 2d 266 (Mass., 1955).
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Gaily case has to some extent been weakened. In this case, the court per-
mitted a Catholic mother to withdraw her consent to an adoption by Jew-
ish petitioners after the mother learned that the children were to be raised
in the Jewish faith. While the petitioners were of the highest calibre, the
court said that it was sure that some Catholic home could be found for the
children. This was the finding that it was "practicable" to place the chil-
dren with persons of the same faith.
Noteworthy in this case is the court's attitude concerning the avail-
ability of persons wishing to adopt children. While no persons were
brought to the court's attention as such, as in the Gaily case, the court
looked beyond this and expressed certainty that potential adopters of the
same faith could be found.
Viewing the three decisions as a whole, it appears that the "when prac-
ticable ... must" statute of Massachusetts is taking on the complexion of
being mandatory. In view of the earlier treatment given religion in that
jurisdiction, this interpretation seems proper.
New York, by the terms of its statute, has left little room for judicial
discretion. It is from the New York enactments that Massachusetts mod-
eled its statute. The New York law reads as follows:
In making orders for adoption ... when practicable the court must give cus-
tody only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the foster child .... 20
A provision of the Social Welfare Code reads:
In appointing guardians of children, and in granting orders of adoption of
children, the court shall, when practicable, appoint [guardians or grant orders
of adoption to persons of the same faith as that of the child]. The provisions of
... this section shall be so interpreted as to assure that in the ... adoption (of
children) its religious faith shall be preserved and protected.21
In Adoption of Anonymous, 22 the petitioners for adoption were of a
different religious faith than that of the child's mother. Otherwise, the
petitioners met all the requisites of a qualified adoptive family. The mother
wished that the child be returned to her and the court so decreed. The
court noted that that jurisdiction had adopted "a definite and positive
policy" regarding the issue and must give custody "when practicable"
only to persons of the same religious faith.
A later New York case, though involving custody only, left no doubt
about the construction of the New York laws. In In re Santos,23 the
mother and children were Catholic. Through circumstances the children
were committed to a Jewish adoption committee in contemplation of
20 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law (McKinney, 1941) c. 14, art. 7, § 113; Emphasis added.
21 N.Y. Social Welfare Law (McKinney, 1941) art. 6, § 373, subdiv. 1-4; Emphasis
added.
22 195 Misc. 6, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (Surr. Ct., 1949).
28 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1st Dep't, 1951).
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adoption. In recommitting the children to an agency of the child's faith
which they agreed should have been done at first the court stated "on the
facts presented herein, the legislative mandate leaves no area for judicial
discretion"; 24 "when practicable" a commitment to an agency of the
child's faith "must" be made. It is significant to note that in the states there
are usually agencies of the child's faith willing to accept them which
eases a finding of practicability.
In In re Santos,25 of controlling weight was the legislative declaration
that the statute shall be construed so as to "preserve and protect" the
child's religion.
It appears that while the courts of Massachusetts and New York are de-
ciding the chief issue of the best interests and welfare of the child, religion
because of the statute has been considered of controlling weight.
Of those states with statutes analogous to those cited above and which
have been interpreted, not all take on aspects of being mandatory. The
statute of Pennsylvania provides that "whenever possible" the petitioners
"shall" be of the same religious faith as the natural parents of the child
to be adopted. 26 In Adoption of Royer,2 7 the court after stating the
rule that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration held
that differences between the religious faiths of the adopting parents and
the natural parents would not alone be the controlling factor in granting
or denying an adoption.2s The approach is discretionary, the court find-
ing no decree of compulsion in the words "whenever possible ... shall."
Minnesota has taken a position similar to the Pennsylvania court by
placing controlling emphasis on the best interests and welfare of the child.
This element, it should be noted, is controlling in all jurisdictions, but
some jurisdictions, e.g., Massachusetts and New York, permit religion
to weigh heavily whereas in Minnesota and Pennsylvania religion is only
a factor to be considered.
The Minnesota code reads:
The court in committing any child or appointing a guardian for him ... shall
place him so far as it deems practicable in the care and custody of some indi-
vidual holding the same religious belief as the parents of the child or with
some association which is controlled by persons of like religious faith with the
parents.29
24Ibid., at 718.
25278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1st Dep't, 1951).
26 Penn. Stat. Ann. (Purdon Supp., 1954) tit. 1, § 4; Emphasis added.
27 34 Del. Co. 402 (1947).
28 See Commonwealth v. McClelland, 70 Pa. Super. 273 (1918) (the children were
of the Protestant faith and the court refused to commit them to a Catholic institu-
tion); Adoption of Cornman, 169 Pa. Super. 641, 84 A. 2d 360 (1951); In re Grove's
Adoption, 28 Pa. Dist. 988 (1918); In re Saunder's Adoption, 1 Pa. D. & C. 541 (1922).
29 Minn. Stat. (1949) S 260.20; Emphasis added.
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The case of In re McKenzie 30 left no doubt as to the Minnesota view.
In that case neither the child's mother nor the father was able to care
for the child. The father petitioned that the child be committed to the
care of the state which in turn placed the child with a Protestant couple.
When this couple sought to adopt the child after rearing it for four
years, the State Board of Control refused its consent adhering to a rule
forbidding adoption of children by persons of a faith different from the
child. This consent was withheld notwithstanding important factors that
the petitioners had the child baptized a Catholic and promised to rear
the child in this faith. In addition, the petitioners were highly qualified
as potential adopters. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the con-
sent was unnecessary and stated tersely: "to blindly follow such a rule
after placing the child for support ... is unreasonable and falls within
the definition of caprice.13 1
Clearly, the reason for the rule. failed. The religion of the child was to
be preserved.
Other legislatures have not handled the religion element as definitively
as the jurisdictions cited above. The "practicable" features of the latter
statutes have not been incorporated in others. The law in Missouri pro-
vides that a child shall not be placed with a guardian of a faith different
from that of the child's parents where another "suitable" person is avail-
able to adopt the child. 32 The Supreme Court of Missouri in In re Duren33
favored a discretionary interpretation of the act and deemed it to be
advisory only in judicially extending it to adoption. In that case a minor
was sought to be adopted by the minor's aunt and uncle who were
Catholics. The child's grandmother intervened and maintained that she
was a Protestant as were the parents of the child. The adoption was
granted. A potent factor in the disposition of the case was that the
father before his death had placed the child with the petitioners with
knowledge that their religion differed from the child's. The decision
hinged on another provision of the Missouri statute which requires that
court approval be given or withheld as the welfare of the child sought
to be adopted may in the opinion of the court dictate.3 4 It appears
that singular emphasis will not be placed on religion though the child's
religion may be subrogated.3 5
The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently, in Eggleston v. Landrum,36
30 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936). 32 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 453, art. 5 § 2.
31 Ibid., at 238 and 748. 33 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W. 2d 343 (1947).
34 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 453, §453.030.
85 See State v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913); Matter of Clements, 12 Mo.
App. 592, aff'd on other grounds, 78 Mo. 352 (1883); In re McFarland, 223 Mo. App.
826, 12 S.W. 2d 523 (1928).
36210 Miss. 645, 50 So. 2d 364 (1951).
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reversed the decision of the trial court which had denied an adoption
solely because the petitioners were students of the Christian Science
Church. While the Mississippi code does not, in terms, provide for the
religion factor, it states that the court may decree'an adoption if the "in-
terest and welfare" of the person sought to be adopted would be "pro-
moted. '3 7 In weighing the factors the court pointed out that the child
had been given all the medical attention that the child needed and that
the petitioners promised the court that, in all cases in the future, medical
care would be provided when necessary. This factor, in addition to the
fact that the child's parents consented, controlled the decision. 3
Like Mississippi, the California statute does not, in terms, provide for
the consideration of religion singularly; and the legislative mandate is that
the adoption be in the best interests of the child and this alone is the
guide. 39 Wisconsin also leaves the prerogative of the issue within judicial
discretion. 40 A contrast to this type of legislation is seen in the Rhode
Island statute. It is unique in the United States, it being, in terms, the
only mandatory statute. The statute provides: "If there is a proper or
suitable person of the same religious faith or persuasion as that of the
child available to whom orders of adoption may be granted" then this
controls the decision. If no such person is available then the court must
place the child with persons of the same faith "when practicable."' 41 As
yet, this statute has not been construed.
Other states have "advisory" legislation which lists religion as an ele-
ment which the court must entertain in its place among other factors in
the exercise of judicial discretion. These states can be classified as "best
interest and welfare" states along with those states not, in terms, pro-
viding for religion. The Ohio statute provides that the suitability of the
adoption of the child be determined "by taking into account racial, re-
ligious and cultural backgrounds" of petitioners and the child. 42 Delaware
provides that a report be filed after an authorized investigation. The re-
port must include information on the religious affiliations of petitioners
in addition to a summary as to the suitability of the prospective home in-
37 Miss. Code (1949) § 1269.
38 See Fowler v. Sutton, 75 So. 2d 438 (Miss., 1954).
39 Civ. Code Cal. (Deering, 1949) c. 2, §§ 221-230; see Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal.
2d 447, 274 P. 2d 860 (1954); In re Sharon's Estate, 179 Cal. 447, 177 P. 2d 83 (1918);
Evan's Estate, 106 Cal. 562, 39 Pac. 860 (1895); In re Johnson's Estate, 98 Cal. 531,
33 Pac. 460 (1893); Adoption of Lingol, 107 Cal. App. 2d 457, 237 P. 2d 57 (1951).
40 Wis. L. (1947) c. 218; The investigatory procedure of Wisconsin provides that
inquiry be made of the pastor of the church to which petitioner may belong; See
In re Adoption of Tschudy, 267 Vis. 272, 65 N.W. 2d 17 (1954); In re Jackson, 210
Wis. 642, 231 N.W. 158 (1930).
41 R. I. Laws (1946) c. 1772.
42 Ohio Rev. Code (1953) c. 31, § 31.0705E.
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cluding the suitability of the religious affiliations. 43 The religion emphasis
here may be overshadowed by a provision in the code that the place-
ment be for the best interest of the child.44 The laws of these states are
ideally suited to give much latitude to the courts.
In 1945, Illinois revised its adoption statutes and in so doing made a
provision for the preservation of the the child's religion. The statute reads:
The court in entering a decree of adoption shall whenever possible give cus-
tody through adoption to a petitioner or petitioners of the same religious belief
as that of the child.45
This provision has not been construed. Historically, Illinois has placed
the welfare of the child as the primary consideration. 46 Recently, in
Dickholtz v. Littfin,47 the court stated that the revisions in the Illinois
law were intended to provide enlargement of the scope of judicial dis-
cretion with a view toward the promotion of the welfare of the child.
It appears unlikely that anything but a discretionary interpretation will
be had. Pennsylvania, with identical "whenever possible"-"shall" features
has taken this view.
Because of the unavailability of cases decided on the statutes, it would
be presumptious to draw any conclusions. However, certain observations
may be made. From a view of the cases involving the "when practicable
... must" features it appears that they take on overtones of being man-
datory. At least, it is clear that the statutes have succeeded in their evi-
dent intent of emphasizing religion. This type of statute is the only one
that has effectively done so. Through an examination of the cases deal-
ing with what amounts to "when practicable . . . shall" statutes and includ-
ing the "whenever possible . . . shall" statutes, it appears that the courts
uniformly favor a discretionary interpretation and adhere to the standard
of the "best interests and welfare" of the child. These states do not recog-
nize that the statutes require that religion be given more weight than be-
fore the statute in ascertaining what is best for the child. Finally, there are
those statutes which list religion as an element and those statutes which
do not, in terms, provide for religion. The results are the same; namely,
that the guide is the welfare of the child and religion takes its place among
the other factors. This construction appears to be consistent with the
statute and the legislative intent.
48 Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 88, § 3551.4.
44Ibid.
45M. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 4, § 4-2; Emphasis added.
46 See McConnell v. McConnell, 345 Il. 70, 177 N.E. 692 (1931); Jackson v. Russell,
342 111. App. 637, 97 N.E. 2d 584 (1951); Hill v. Allabaugh, 333 Ill. App. 602, 78 N.E.
2d 127 (1948); 1. L. P., Adoption § 48 (1953).
47 341 l1. App. 400, 94 N.E. 2d 89 (1950).
